Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here for FREE ACCESS to this landmark database

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Theory & Psychology
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Trendler, G.
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Measurement Theory, Psychology and the Revolution That Cannot Happen

Günter Trendler

UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG, guenter.trendler{at}zi-mannheim.de

Doubt is raised that revolutions in measurement theory, for example conjoint measurement or Rasch measurement, will lead to the quantification of psychological attributes. First, the meaning of measurement is explained. Relying on this, it is demonstrated that in order to attain quantification under causally complex circumstances it is necessary to manipulate the phenomena involved and control systematic disturbances. The construction of experimental apparatus is necessary to accomplish these tasks. The creation of modern quantitative science through the adoption of this method is called the Galilean revolution. Next the Millean quantity objection is formulated. If the Galilean revolution is not possible in psychology, the task of quantification is not solvable. The objection is defended. Psychological phenomena are neither manipulable nor controllable to the required extent. Therefore they are not measurable.

Key Words: laws of nature • measurement theory • quantification • quantity objection

Theory & Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 5, 579-599 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0959354309341926


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?